The Real History of the CPF and the Singapore Economy

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The PAP Government Planned to Ask Singaporeans to Use 80% of CPF for Housing

We know that the PAP government knew how they were manipulating the CPF contribution rates because in 1982, the then-Minister for Labour and Communications had said that “the CPF contribution rate is likely to increase to 50% in the future. Of this 50%, 40% will be for housing and other uses, 6% for Medisave and the remainder for old age and contingencies.” So, evidently, of the 50% that was paid into the CPF, a whooping 40% was intended by the PAP government to go into housing financing!

However, “The international experience suggests that a contribution rate of 10 to 15 percent should be sufficient for providing a replacement rate of between 35 and 40 percent plus survivors insurance benefits.” If so, why did the PAP government make Singaporeans pay an excessive 50% of our wages then and 37% of our wages today into the CPF?

The PAP Government Monopolised the Housing Market by Using Our CPF

So after 1986, the PAP government did not withdraw from the over-use of the CPF for HDB but instead continued with their addiction to finesse their wealth accumulation.

Essentially, “the CPF has (become) a substitute for the mortgage market.

Indeed, it is “Through a carefully controlled circular flow of funds (that) CPF savings have been used to enable individuals to fund the construction and ownership of government flats” which “In effect (means) the CPF scheme substitutes for the absence of a housing mortgage market.” In other words, the PAP government was able to “‘create’… (their intention of) homeownership was  by directing savings in the Central Provident Fund (CPF) towards housing.

Central Provident Fund in Singapore CPF-HDB Circular Flow of Funds

By the HDB’s 25th anniversary in 1985 (a year after the PAP’s 25th anniversary), of the 84 per cent of the population housed in HDB dwellings, 76 per cent were living in flats they owned. The 1995 figures are 86 per cent and 90 per cent, respectively. Home ownership among resident households stood at 92.8 per cent in 2003.

In this way, “The government (became) not only the largest housing developer, but also the largest mortgage provider through the Housing & Development Board (HDB). The massive scale of government mortgage loans totalled 60.1 billion Singapore dollars (SGD) in the year 2000, which was much higher than the total housing loans of the private sector (SGD 38.6 billion).” Phang Sock-Yong detailed that”In 1970, shortly after the implementation of the CPF Approved Housing Scheme, outstanding housing loans were a mere S$215 million. This constituted only four percent of GNP, a figure within the range presently prevailing in Central Europe and Russia. Even at that early stage, HDB loans had already exceeded banks and finance houses loans, comprising 58 percent of the total. With increases in homeownership rates and housing prices, housing loans grew rapidly from S$215 million in 1970 to S$113,081 million by 2003. The 2003 ratio of outstanding housing loans to GDP at 71 percent is certainly the highest in Asia (compare Hong Kong at 39 percent, Japan 35 percent, Taiwan 26 percent, Malaysia 22 percent, Thailand 16 percent, Korea 14 percent, Philippines 12 percent and China eight percent).

Effectively, “The CPF system has dominated residential mortgage financing in Singapore. As at March 31 2012, 1.38 million members had withdrawn net amount of $ 101.9 billion for public housing scheme.

In sum, the PAP government, via “the Housing and Development Board (HDB)“, was able to become “a monopoly supplier of public housing and its mortgage provider, administered through the CPF“. Most importantly, “the absence of common or constitutional right to land ownership” allowed the PAP government to do so.

The PAP Government Acquired Land to Allow Them to Build Cheaper Flats

Indeed, the Land Acquisition Act 1966 was called “the most powerful piece of government legislation“. “The result of this was that the proportion of land under state ownership increased from 44% in 1960 to 76% by 1985.

In fact, the Minister for Labour and Communications had said in 1982:

HDB has been able to keep such costs low mainly because it borrows from the Government millions of dollars each year at only 6% per annum. Government, on the other hand, obtains its low cost funds through the issue of Government bonds; and the CPF has been a major purchaser of these bonds. As at September 1982, CPF had $14.22 billion invested in Government bonds and deposited as advance deposits with the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Of this amount, $6.81 billion had been invested in the bonds over the 5-year period up to April 1982. On the other hand, total Government loan to HDB amounted to $6.73 billion during the same period.

In short, “The CPF purchases government stocks, and the government loans the money cheaply to the HDB.” The HDB then “lends part of this money to purchasers of HDB flats.

Construction costs were thus initially kept low as “The HDB was able to price its units below market prices mainly because HDB flats are built on state owned land, much of which had been compulsorily acquired from private landowners at below market prices. This was made possible by the Land Acquisition Act, enacted in 1966,” “which empowered the government to acquire land cheaply whatever land it might need for housing development“. “The rate of compensation was set by statute and independent of both market value and the landowner’s purchase price. This exercise wiped out land rent gains for affected landowners, some of whom suffered actual losses having purchased their land at prices above the statutory determined value. Some landowners even had to continue with mortgage repayments for land which had already been acquired by the government.

Goodman, Kwon and White said that, “If there had been a strong landlord class with a vested interest in land, the housing policy could never have been carried through as easily as it was.” However, as it turns out, the government had almost wiped out the landlord class in Singapore then, but has instead installed themselves as one of the major real estate owners, via HDB and real estate companies owned by Temasek Holdings, which begs the question – are we none the better off today, since now, with the government’s “vested interest in land”, has this disadvantageous to Singaporeans?

But the PAP Government Got Hooked on Using the CPF to Drive Up Housing Prices

In fact, “The government is not an entirely innocent party“. First, “higher artificial demand is generated in pursuance of the(ir) 100 per cent homeownership policy” and because of “The relaxation of housing rules by both the HDB and CPF (which) made public and private housing more substitutable, An unintended, but unholy alliance conspired as the whole residential market becomes a de facto cartel with HDB and a handful of private developers on the supply side.

On top of that, “The situation is aggravated by the state as the largest land owner and exercises land sales from its land bank on a tender system, inflating costs in its own way. The consequence is both public and private sector housing prices feed on each other. Each time price increases from either housing sector, a corresponding effect is inevitable on the other. The two-way causality is blurred as the distinction between public and private housing diminishes.

Ong and Sing (2002) studied the inter-market price discovery process between the private and public resale markets and (also) found significant evidence that the two markets were integrated.”

Flat prices therefore went into a dangerous upward spiral as “Higher income and affordability, higher HDB prices and eligibility, and one residential market instead of separate public housing and private housing markets, interact in an inflationary vicious circle.” Also, “Low interest rates have further encouraged mortgages and financing as have CPF liberalization. The stock and property markets tied up as one speculative market fuel each other too.

Nominal House Price Indices and CPI

Indeed, because the PAP government allowed the CPF for use for housing, this meant “purchasing properties that are bigger than the case where there were no CPF (occurred) and the purchases were financed by the residents’ own savings. That is, the extra savings due to the CPF system had induced a demand for bigger flats in Singapore. This in turn supported a higher level of property price over the years.

The irony is 100 per cent home ownership limits the rental market to foreigners. If business costs including rentals are uncompetitive, there will be no investment, no demand for rentals” and “with 100 per cent home ownership and no rental support for most properties, price may spiral downward“.

Because of this, Singaporeans are today trapped in a CPF-HDB loop where there needs to be “implicit price support from the government to preserve asset value” and “It is crucial that Singaporeans do not migrate en masse or the support is broken, to trigger downward spirals as more would sell their properties to rent at cheaper rates.

Ironically, “It seems almost common sense that postwar baby boomers who are renters rather than home owners have a greater financial security than home owners which are typically “asset rich, cash poor”.

In fact, where Minister for National Development Khaw Boon Wah had recently admitted that, “we control the (public housing) construction programme; secondly, we set the price (for the HDB flats),” it might perhaps be highly problematic that if the PAP government has such overarching control that they still allowed housing prices to spiral out of control.

Khaw Boon Wah Firstly, we control the construction programmes. Secondly, we set the price

The PAP Government Created Further Policies to Drive Up Housing Prices

More importantly, now we know:

  • In 1986, the PAP government was warned not to continue using the CPF to (over-)drive up housing demand and prices but the PAP government ignored these warnings.
  • Also, now that we know that the PAP government sets housing prices, why did they continue their fanatic pursuit to drive prices upwards?

Indeed, the upward spiral of HDB prices was caused by the direct effects of the PAP government’s policies.

Not only that, the PAP then started artificially pushing up prices for HDB flats in “the 1980s … (by) reduc(ing) subsidy (where) HDB changed and gradually increased its prices based on housing type, location, floor level, view, and other aesthetic factors.

Also, while flat prices were previously kept below market rates, “Land cost (was eventually) incorporated in the final selling prices … though the true formula is not revealed. The consequence has been gradual, but certainly higher housing costs invariably impinging on wage and land costs.” Today, land costs have grown so significantly that “Land now makes up about three-fifths of development cost on average, up from two-fifths in 2008“.

Slide3

And thus “between 1981 and 1988, four-room flat prices rose by an average of only 2.5% per year, but between 1988 and 1992, prices increased dramatically by an average of 12% every year!”

Slide5

And from 2008 to 2013, “land costs have grown at an average compound rate of 18.2 per cent a year, compared with 9.1 per cent for HDB resale prices” but “incomes (only) rose at a compound annual rate of 5.3 per cent for the average household“.

Slide6

And because of these policies, “Deregulation of the HDB resale market has been accompanied by an increase in the number of transactions. The transaction volume of resale HDB flats increased from fewer than 800 units in 1979, to 13000 units in 1987, 60000 units in 1999, and 31000 in 2004. Resale transactions as a proportion of total (new and resale) owner-occupied public housing transactions, were three percent, 37 percent, 64 percent and 68 percent in 1979, 1987, 1999, and 2004 respectively. The increase in the demand for resale flats in the latter half of the 1990s is in part due to the introduction of demand side housing grants.

A study by Phang and Wong (1997) shows that policies on the availability of HDB and CPF finance for housing had the most significant impacts on housing prices. These policies include extending the use of CPF savings for private housing in 1981, liberalizing the terms of HDB mortgage loans for resale flats in 1993, and the introduction of CPF grants for purchasing HDB resale flats in 1994. Such ‘shocks’ on the demand side needed to be offset by government policies to generate the requisite supply, although these have not always been well synchronized.

In fact, when you look at the introduction of these policies and the subsequent increase in HDB prices, you can see the immediate effects of these policies in the chart below. Also, over the past decade, there has also been an escalation in housing prices due to the sudden influx of migrant inflow (see chart on migrant inflow trend below). Whether or not the intention was to bring in foreign demand due to the saturated demand among Singaporeans, the policy was effective. But the ill-effects were to drive up not only housing prices but prices across the board, as can be seen in how Singapore is now the most expensive place to live in, in the world.

Slide1

This spurred Lee Kuan Yew to ponder later on:

I should have known that it does not pay to yield to popular pressure beyond our capacity to deliver. Yet I was party to a similar mistake in the early 1990s. As property prices rose, everybody wanted to make a profit on the sale of their old flat and then upgrade to a new one, the biggest they could afford. Instead of choking off demand by charging a levy to reduce their windfall profits, I agreed that we accommodate the voters by increasing the number of flats built. That aggravated the real estate bubble and made it more painful when the currency crisis struck in 1997. Had we choked off the demand earlier, in 1995, we would have been immensely better off.

Yet, why then did the PAP government ignore the early warnings in 1986 which had detailed the side-effects of an over-fuelling of the housing bubble, via the over-use of the CPF, and why did the PAP government continue to create three more housing bubbles in 1997, 2008 and today?

Professor Phang Sock-Yong explained that:

One can infer that housing and land price levels in Singapore are higher with the CPF housing scheme than without. In the first decade (1968 – 1981) when the CPF savings was directed only toward public housing, administered prices, stringent eligibility criteria, and long waiting lists were used to allocate the HDB’s supply of new flats. Moreover, in the absence of a secondary market for HDB flats during that period, the inflationary impacts on a tightly regulated housing sector were not immediately apparent.

However, such mechanisms could not be used when savings were similarly directed to private housing beginning in 1981. The 1981 liberalization as well as the 1993 liberalization of HDB and CPF regulations for HDB resale flat housing loans had significant impacts on housing prices, contributing to the development of speculative bubbles that subsequently burst.

When the CPF contribution rates were used for macroeconomic stabilization, increased to mitigate inflationary pressures from higher wages (1978 – 1984) or cut to reduce wage costs and preserve jobs (1985 and 1998), the effect was to exacerbate the housing price boom and bust by channeling resources into real estate during an inflationary period and reducing resources to the sector during a recession.

Singapore’s mandatory savings and housing policies have very substantial impacts on household’s consumption and investment patterns. Savers’ and consumers’ rights in decision making are constrained by numerous CPF and HDB restrictions and regulations. Consumption inefficiencies arise when households value the in-kind transfers/subsidies at less than the costs of providing them, or alternatively, at less than an equivalent cost but unrestricted cash grant. Moreover, numerous regulations to prevent profiteering and speculation as well as restrictions in housing location choice resulted in inefficient location and commute patterns for households.

Dr. Richard Wong, Director of the Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research, also summed up the problem with using the CPF to fund HDB:

The Homeownership Scheme had many important consequences. First, the CPF started to withhold from individuals an increasingly large portion of their own financial wealth. The result was, according to the Report of the Central Provident Fund Study Group (1985) chaired by Professor Lim Chong-Yah: “to emasculate their sense of economic initiative and enterprise”.

Second, the CPF ceased to be a simple old-age security savings-withdrawal scheme, but became the vehicle for massive state intervention into the housing and capital markets with profound effects. The principle that an individual’s benefit would equal what he contributed was effectively abandoned since the gains and losses from home purchase decisions were heavily influenced by the terms and conditions of the financing schemes and housing allocation rules that have unavoidable distributional effects. The timing of the purchase was, for example, often an important determinant of capital gains. Since the terms and conditions have evolved over time, the redistribution may be very complex, but there can be little doubt that the allocative distortions must have been enormous.

This sequence of liberalization measures contradicted the original aims of the CPF as a compulsory savings scheme. Why compel in the first place if you were going to allow for so many types of withdrawals later on? What it does reveal is the enormous unpopularity of the mandatory savings scheme so that its most unappealing constraints on personal choice have to be mitigated.

The advisability of putting large sums of money in the hands of the government was questioned in the highly influential Report (1985) by Lim. It states: “[T]he large sums of money vested with the fund are in effect held `hostage’ to governmental decision-making: ipso facto, this would be acceptable if there is a guarantee that future governments would be as honourable and as capable as the present one, but can such a guarantee ever be forthcoming?”.

First, it is doubtful that the vast CPF machinery has resulted in a more efficient allocation of resources. Second, one can argue, at least in principle, that the Singapore CPF has probably resulted in a society where most people are more equal, except for the gap between the rulers and the ruled. But this has been achieved by forcing everyone to earn a 2 percent real rate of return on some 40 percent of their savings.

Indeed, today the income inequality in Singapore has become exacerbated precisely because of the PAP’s over-control and dominance in not just the political landscape, but the housing landscape as well.

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34 comments

    • @tan

      tan,
      i guess, you are a woman’s, hmm, guess again, you are an old single woman, understand why are you so bitchy, you like stopping by, but always wrong door, your PAP’s door is not here, pls out ! never come back again ! here no welcome an old single woman like you , even no man in PAP wants you !

  1. I Am A New Citizen

    After reading Roy’s blog, I now realize my mistake.
    As a Singaporean citizen now, I fully understand the disadvantages of citizenship.
    I fully support all efforts to abolish CPF and NS.
    It’s definitely in my self interest to vote Opposition.

  2. Deaf Toad's Toothpick

    Does Ngerng really believe the rubbish he spouted? With all the accusations he made posts after posts, it would be hardpressed to believe that he won’t be sued over and over again.

    But it makes for good drama, I admit.

    • Monkey See, Monkey Do

      ” … its like saying the sky is blue because I am wearing a blue shirt.”

      Oh! You mean like;
      I once knew an old man who withdraw all his CPF money.
      Within 6 months he used up all his money on gambling (@ PAP’s 2 casinos) and women in Batam.
      And now he wants welfare from the PAP government.
      Because of this one instance (no proof that it happened)
      PAP government is fully justified to hold onto Singaporeans’ CPF money beyond 55 years under a set of ever “evolving” rules.

  3. Daryl

    It has always been the bane of Singaporeans that the govn is able to arbitrarily increase HDB prices year after year. It is not a free market as many professionals will attest to. How can it be when the govn owns the very flats we stay in and sets the prices based on factors that the govn control – like land costs, roads, carpark, recreation area costs etc !!!! Completely ridiculous !!! And the facts are that the monies in the CPF belong to the people and the govn should be responsible enough to manage the funds for the benefit of the people, not make use of them for their own enrichment !!! bull to the PAP !!! Crappy govn that we have !!!

  4. RYAN

    Lee Hsien Loong’s speech has brought a serious crisis for each CPF owner, not only govern long-term economic stagnation and corruption lead to social discontent over 10 years, also affect the government’s popularity. hope the people of Singapore unite forces, called on him to hand over power to step down as soon as possible.

  5. ThankURoy

    I am SURPRISED that @tan and @Deaf Toad’s Toothpick ‘read’ without realising that Roy is quoting from books and not come up with his own theory. Roy has made a GREAT EFFORT in bringing these information to the mass who may not be aware that experts have been warning the Govt. Whoever wants to SUE, should sue the source of the information, ie. the experts and authors of those books (including, the one who say ‘you will repent’).

    Blessings be with Singapore! (with people in the 60%)

    • The Oracle

      Roy quoted books but also put his usual anti-government its-easy-in-hindsight free-and-easy-with-the-numbers spin on everything.

      His numbers are rarely correct – for example: “By 1985, Singaporeans had to pay half our wages into the CPF!”. To be more precise at this time employees contributed 25% and employers contributed 25% so Roy concludes people are paying half their wages in CPF – but this is just wrong.

      The correct percentage in 1985, using an example of a $2,000 salary, is:
      Employee contribution: $500
      Employer contribution: $500
      Percent of total income to CPF = (employee + employer contribution)/(salary + employer contribution) = 1000/2500 = 40%
      Employee takes home 60% of total income or 75% of salary and at no time does he only receive 50%.

      It doesn’t matter that I’ve pointed this out before as Roy clearly doesn’t want facts to get in the way of a good story.

      • A PM Lee Fish Story

        I think PM Lee cares more for a discarded fishball stick than he does about disadvantaged Singaporeans.
        One brand new government agency because of a discarded fishball stick.

        Do you think PM Lee will form one new government agency because one Singaporean has been left behind?

      • ThankURoy

        Thank you @The Oracle, for highlighting the numbers, the way I thank Roy for his numbers.

        I think at the end of the day, the essence of the issue is ‘Are Singaporeans getting better?’
        Not just in terms of numbers stated in Statistics, but overall ‘FEEL’ as a Singaporean.

        @The Oracle cannot deny the fact that more SMCs being voted to the Opposition is an obvious sign that something is not right. Only about 30-over% votes given to an ex-PAP-related President is also a sign that more are getting unhappy with the incumbent. Social media is just a platform for more transparency.

        To add insult to Singaporeans, is the way that the incumbent solve problem, like forming a new agency, instead of looking at duplication of roles in the Ministries, over a ‘fishball stick’. It just goes to show how the incumbent too, does not want the facts (put up through the ‘voices’ in the social media) to get in the way of their ‘good show’.

      • The Oracle

        Definitely some truth in that – the world is changing and that it is much easier for citizens to criticize and harder to ignore them – and government needs to be more inclusive of all sectors of our society.

  6. anon

    Perhaps Roy could consider packing all the pages into a single file of a suitable format (eg .MHT, .PDF, .DOC .EPUB etc). It may be an easier read compared to 8 pages online all at one sitting

    Do take note of any copyright issues though.

  7. seesiwpeng

    @The Orcle…you lowly scum bastard dog is back after getting permission from your Line Leader?
    Who cares what you spew nonsense here, we allow you here to make u a scumbag bastardize idiot banana sucking dog eating from the crumbs of the table of all of us, as usual digging with fingers to satisfy of your lowly scum swine masters…
    honest to the bone, even unto you wearing a skirt is so insulting to women! asking you to screw a spider is so insulting to the creature…guess what, you are the lowest of evolution ever seen here on Earth!

    • The Oracle

      Hahahahaha! You can’t stand even the slightest criticism of Roy and this just proves you and your fellow members of Roy’s gang are not fit to run a country!

      • reply "The Oracle"

        The Oracle,
        in your country, Your happiness index ranked first outside,
        95% women never married , and you still enjoy the paper,
        don’t you think a severe deformity of Singapore, as a leader to be responsible,

        about you, The Oracle !
        you took huge pay daily , you talk a bunch of unrealistic here with a group of unemployed & unfortunately people, such person like you, if still alive today, better go as good as dead.

  8. The Oracle

    I apologise to all that m such a scum, please forgive me and I shall learn to jerk out well before coming to this Blog again.

    • The Oracle

      I apologize for being a PAP idiot-savant.
      My PAP parents dropped me on my head when I was an infant.
      They say it was an accident.

  9. 请他早点滚下台

    你们的总理不喜欢听到贪污这个字,那么, 用“贪心”两个字最适合他 。他170万年薪, 是全部4000户人家的生计总和,是美国总统的4倍。 可见他是那么的贪心, 用巨大地胃口来满足贪心, 排名全球贪心指数第一名。

    新加坡人民团结起来,推翻这个腐败贪心的领导人。请他早点滚下台 !

    Your Prime minister Lee don’t like to hear the ” corruption ” such word,
    therefor, use “greedy” word most suitable for him.
    His annual salary is 1.7 million USD, is the sum of all the 4000 people’s livelihood, is four times of the American president’s.
    Showing that he is so greedy, too greedy.
    with an huge appetite to satisfy the greedy, greedy index ranked first worldwide.
    Singaporeans unite to overthrow the corrupt greedy leaders.

  10. 他要挤干你的最后一滴血

    过了55岁继续扣押我们的公积金,因为李总理老婆的淡马锡控股某个交易亏本, 所以要拖死我们,那么某个交易赚钱,为什么不分给我们 ? 他老婆亏本要我们多赔10年, 他老婆赚钱分红没有我们,他要我们省吃俭用,租出房间来套现, TMD这一家子不是人 !

    做老公的李总理,要为老婆何晶每天从淡马锡控股拿巨额回报保密,什么天机不可泄密,一对缺德货色,不如他们早早死掉算了 , 他们活着对人民一点意义都没有, 反而整天控告人民, 搞到有工作的人, 被失去工作, 没工作的人,被晾在一边。好像一切不关他们的事。不做好事的总理,不为人民做事的总理, 他们是人民的公敌, 现在,人民要团结,把他赶下台。

  11. Pingback: What PAP Has Done to Your CPF and Doesn’t Want Singaporeans to Know (The Real History) | The Heart Truths
    • The Oracle

      Even that is way too high. The potential short-changed amount:

      1) Start with total funds in CPF today: $264,767,600,000
      Source: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/browse_by_theme/hhld_sector_balance_sheet.html

      2) Interest paid ranges from 2.5% to 5% with many getting 3.5% to 5% as Roy asserts more than half have circa $55,000 (less than the potential $60,000 that gets an extra 1%). All in all we can assume the average is 3.5% as paid on the special Singapore government bonds (those with smaller balances do better and those with bigger balances do a bit worse).

      3) What should CPF pay? Given GIC real rate of return over the past 20 years of 4.1% and inflation over the same 20 years of 1.9%, a case can be made for 6% return instead of 3.5%.

      4) Other assumptions: Average CPF member in the scheme for 20 years, annual wage growth of 6% notional. I put it all in a spreadsheet and:

      CPF Contributions CPF Actual CPF Ideal
      6.00% 3.50% 6.00%

      1995 5,250,000,000 $5,433,750,000 $5,565,000,000
      1996 5,565,000,000 $11,383,706,250 $11,797,800,000
      1997 5,898,900,000 $17,887,497,469 $18,758,502,000
      1998 6,252,834,000 $24,985,243,070 $26,512,016,160
      1999 6,628,004,040 $32,719,710,759 $35,128,421,412
      2000 7,025,684,282 $41,136,483,868 $44,683,352,036
      2001 7,447,225,339 $50,284,139,029 $55,258,412,018
      2002 7,894,058,860 $60,214,434,815 $66,941,619,130
      2003 8,367,702,391 $70,982,512,009 $79,827,880,813
      2004 8,869,764,535 $82,647,106,223 $94,019,504,068
      2005 9,401,950,407 $95,270,773,611 $109,626,741,744
      2006 9,966,067,431 $108,920,130,479 $126,768,377,726
      2007 10,564,031,477 $123,666,107,625 $145,572,353,755
      2008 11,197,873,366 $139,584,220,325 $166,176,440,748
      2009 11,869,745,768 $156,754,854,906 $188,728,957,707
      2010 12,581,930,514 $175,263,572,910 $213,389,541,514
      2011 13,336,846,345 $195,201,433,928 $240,329,971,130
      2012 14,137,057,125 $216,665,338,240 $269,735,049,950
      2013 14,985,280,553 $239,758,390,451 $301,803,550,333
      2014 15,884,397,386 $264,590,285,411 $336,749,224,582

      Difference: $72,158,939,171
      Per member short: $24,052.98
      Above based on average balance of: $88,196.76
      For Median balance of $55,000 as stated by Roy:
      Per member short: $14,999.57

      So, the average member as defined by Roy has about $15,000 less in their CPF account, subject to confirmation of my assumptions. You can’t count the money withdrawn over the years for housing loans unless you also count the profit members have made on those properties.

      $15,000 is still significant but nothing like the crazy numbers Roy claims.

      • reply The Oracle

        old man at trickery and sly wily like old fox, you are the black hand ruined your premier

  12. Pingback: 行动党是如何操纵我们的公积金资金?为什么他们不让新加坡人民知道公积金的历史真相?《第一部分》 | The Heart Truths
  13. Pingback: How PAP Created Inequality in Singapore: Will Singapore Collapse? | The Heart Truths
  14. teoenming

    Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong Want Teo En Ming Dead

    Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong want Teo En Ming dead. Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong want Teo En Ming to die young. I am only 36 years old. I do not want to die young. I want to live to a hundred years old and beyond!!! I want to live to a hundred years old and beyond!!! I want to live to a hundred years old and beyond!!! I want to live to a hundred years old and beyond!!! I want to live to a hundred years old and beyond!!!

    In fact, I want to live forever!!!
    In fact, I want to live forever!!!
    In fact, I want to live forever!!!
    In fact, I want to live forever!!!
    In fact, I want to live forever!!!

    Teo En Ming has filed an official complaint against the Singapore Government at the United Nations Human Rights Council Branch and the International Criminal Court. Read the letter here:

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    ***********************************************************************************

    Teo En Ming’s Open Letter (Plea for Medical Help/Assistance) to World Leaders dated 27 Aug 2010. Read the letter here:

    http://lists.mcs.anl.gov/pipermail/mpich-discuss/2010-August/007811.html

    Mr. Teo En Ming (Zhang Enming)
    Singapore Citizen
    Republic of Singapore
    14 Jan 2015 Wednesday

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